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ABSTRACT 
This research studies the ability of 11 combat logistics force (CLF) ships and four 
transport aircraft to support building and sustaining operations at four maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance military airbases throughout the African continent.  We have 
implemented a traditional hub and spoke (H&S) concept with sample demand data 
provided by the staff of Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Seventh Fleet, in 
a hypothetical situation where U.S. forces are required to assist the Nigerian government.  
We use the CLF Planner optimization tool to obtain shuttle schedules for three scenarios 
of daily demands of four commodities.  One scenario requires the buildup of an airbase 
within seven days, and the other two require so in three days.  All CLF shuttles have been 
randomly selected, positioned and loaded with commodities.  Depending on the length of 
the buildup phase and the initial stock of commodities at the H&S, we find that the 
continuous sustainment operations (over a 45-day planning horizon) may not be feasible 
in some cases.  Specifically, if a short buildup phase is required, we recommend the 
prepositioning of commodities at a minimum of 25% of daily demands, and dedicated air 
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Maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), a U.S. Navy asset, belongs to a 
community that has been a transformational force as it has adapted to changes in mission 
requirements. This research studies the ability of combat logistics force (CLF) ships and 
military transport (C17 aircraft) to support the building and sustainment operations at 
four MPRA military airbases: Djibouti, Djibouti (DJIBG); Dakar, Senegal (DAKBG); 
Algiers, Algeria (ALGBG); and Lagos, Nigeria (LAGBG), along with one maritime 
reception center (MRC) in Rota, Spain.   
An MRC serves multiple functions, which include letting aircraft launched into 
joint operations areas conduct a mission enroute to its forward operating base, and 
leveraging “economy of force” efficiencies to support multiple theaters of operation 
through distribution of limited assets from secure locations.   
We have implemented a traditional hub and spoke (H&S) concept with sample 
demand data from the staff of Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Seventh 
Fleet.  We have used the CLF Planner, developed by students and faculty at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, to obtain optimal shuttle schedules for three scenarios.  We 
hypothesize a message received from the Nigerian government requesting military 
assistance from the United States to build a coalition fighting force to help end the violent 
efforts of opposed Nigerian forces.  The missions flown from each H&S are exclusive to 
that airbase and our model has focused on the sustainment of commodities.  Although 
this study provides results for a Nigerian scenario, the methodology may be used for any 
region and scenario where the H&S concept is applicable. 
Our H&S model is unique to CLF Planner, requiring customized coding in order 
to allow air shuttles to deliver commodities to the customers.  CLF Planner uses multiple 
data inputs with precise coordinates and great circle navigation points to represent the sea 
routes and point-to-point air routes that service our H&S.  We have represented the 
region’s routes using 108 nodes and 177 undirected arcs.  We, also, replicate 15 
indiscriminant shuttles from six classes (six Henry J. Kaiser-Class Single Hull (TAO-
 xviii 
SH), one Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship (T-AKE), one Combat Stores Ship (T-
AFS), two Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE), one United Kingdom’s Fort Victoria 
class replenishment oiler (UK-AORH), and four C17s as air shuttles).  All of our CLF 
shuttles have been randomly selected from a list of joint, allied and coalition forces. At 
the beginning of the planning horizon, shuttles have been randomly positioned 
throughout our theoretical area of responsibility and either loaded with the four 
commodities (aviation fuel (JP8), ground support equipment diesel fuel (GSF), ground 
support equipment (GSE), and military ordnance (ORDN)) required at the H&S or started 
empty.  Specifically, four surface ships and all four C17s are loaded while the remaining 
seven surface ships are not.   
We have tested three scenarios, S1, S2, and S3, respectively, of daily demands of 
each of the commodities over a 45-day planning horizon.   Each scenario consists of three 
phases: buildup, pre-operations and sustainment.  We assume a safety-stock level is 
reached if inventory falls 50% below its total capacity.  The same is true for an extremis 
level whenever the commodity inventory falls below 25%.  A penalty is applied when 
inventory levels fall below either measure, but a more stringent penalty occurs when 
below the extremis level.  CLF Planner has produced computational results for each 
scenario with which decision makers may gain important insights in the planning of the 
operations supported from H&S. 
In Scenario S1, entitled “Heavy BuildUp,” we start with an empty airbase that 
needs to be built, within seven days, into a functioning hub (or spoke) that is capable of 
continued sustainment of MPRA missions.  We meet 100% of the demands for the JP8, 
GSE, and GSF commodities for all but DAKBG, which still achieves 98% sustainment 
for both JP8 and GSF.  While some shuttles work expeditiously in order to fulfill H&S’s 
demands, the TAO_SH class shuttles are used only modestly because they cannot carry 
ORDN. The rest of the unmet demand is due solely to long transit times for all CLF 
surface ships.  




phase must be completed in only three days.  Our computational analysis shows that this 
results in a more difficult sustainment phase than in scenario S1: All commodities for all 
H&S spend more days below extremis levels.  
S3 has the same “Minimum BuildUp” requirements as in S2.  However, we 
assume dedicated ORDN air shuttles and pre-positioning of commodities at the extremis 
level at the beginning of the planning horizon.  All demand is met during the sustainment 
phase.  We conclude that our two additions from S2 to S3 help create a tailored solution 
to logistical concerns within the MPRA community. We recommend this scenario for 
MPRA operations employing the H&S concept as it may be used for other regions and 
scenarios to identify critical commodities to pre-position. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Seventh Fleet (CTF-72) has an 
ongoing requirement to provide maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) to 
conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the Pacific and Central 
Commanders’ areas of responsibility (AORs).  Missions may also include anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW), surface warfare (SUW), inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), mining 
warfare, and enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA).  Transportation of aviation 
fuel, food and dry stores, and ordnance from a supplier, the maritime reception center 
(MRC), to several hub and spokes (H&S) is required in order to support these 
responsibilities.  This thesis studies the sustainment of these logistics demands via 
Globemaster III (C17) aircraft and combat logistics force (CLF) resources.   
Prior to operational plan (OPLAN) execution, pre-positioning of MPRA and their 
logistics equipment and personnel to forward bases is required.  Important aspects to be 
considered include: (a) building up logistics support for each airbase; (b) sustaining 
logistics demands at each location; and (c) relocating personnel and equipment in the 
event of destruction of any of the active H&S locations upheld by MPRA.  This research 
focuses on the entire sustainment effort to include the transport of ground support 
equipment (GSE) and utilization during OPLAN progression involving MPRA (CTF-72, 
2009). 
Currently, the aircraft intermediate maintenance depot (AIMD) along with the 
aviation supply department (ASD), onboard most naval air stations, help provide storage 
of many weapons, parts, maintenance materiel and all the necessary logistics items to 
keep aircraft operational.  The MRC is the central hub designed to stock supplies for the 
entire AOR and distribute logistics to the ASD in which then AIMD keeps MPRA fully 
mission-capable for each flight, or sortie.   
There are primarily two critical elements recognized in maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance forces (MPRF):  command and control (C2) and logistics.  This thesis 
explores the optimal sustainment of logistics requirements at H&S, that is, how CTF-72 
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may best benefit from the use of C17 aircraft and CLF ships to keep H&S fully 
operational and engaged in the missions they must accomplish. 
A. HUB AND SPOKE AIR BASES 
1.  Overview 
The H&S model is intended for routine and expeditionary operations.  The 
concept comes from the passenger and freight air carriers’ idea of a central hub and 
multiple spokes that feed directly from the hub to each location (Dobson and Lederer, 
1993).  Also, this design is intended to allow travel from within spokes.  The H&S model 
involves an expeditionary power projection operation formulated by the staff of CTF-72 
(Figure 1).  For this research, we assume each H&S will be collocated with a U.S. Navy 
MPRA airbase. 
Since MPRA are land-based aircraft, their locations are analogous to “primary” 
and “expeditionary” airbases.  A hub may occupy more space and be able to support 
MPRA, to include fuel supply, sonobuoys, weapon load-outs (torpedoes and missiles), 
emergency GSE, etc.  A spoke would be required to maintain similar supplies but its 
capacity may not exceed the total (aircraft or essential personnel) count of a hub.  H&S 
should be carefully selected to ensure continued operations based on threat level and 
possible enemy attack.  Some considerations when creating a hub or spoke are:   
1. Its relative location with respect to the AOR (in particular, MPRA transit 
time);  
2. Its ramp capacities (aircraft and equipment);  
3. Its capabilities to support emergency and/or distressed joint or coalition 
aircraft;  
4. Its weather, which may affect the availability of the location; and,  




Figure 1.   Hub and spoke schematic.  This emphasizes the importance of expeditionary 
power projection as being flexible, scalable, and responsive.  This figure also 
displays the routine operations (RO) tree with branches as either hubs or 
spokes.   The depicted transition phase shows the crossover from RO to major 
combat operations (MCO).  Within the MCO tree are branches similar to RO 
but we also note the collocated hub and spoke “C,” which is designed to serve 
coalition operations.  The fallback hub is designed to become operational 
within 72 hours in the event a current hub or spoke is destroyed or refocus on 
the HA/DR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) missions.  (CTF-72 
2009.) 
The H&S idea is intended to differentiate between a mobile (primary) hub and 
expeditionary spokes that are expected to be operational within 72 hours of their 
positioning in the AOR.  “A hub provides operations, logistics, maintenance and the data 
analysis center for current operations while the expeditionary spokes provide forward, 
ready-response forces detachable to remote locations” (CTF-72, 2009).  The overall 
concept allows theater surveillance and reconnaissance operations without permanently 
constructed infrastructure (Figure 2). 
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2.  Hub Capabilities 
“The Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces must be postured to 
sustain and advance a broad, competitive advantage over emerging 21st century threats, 
and the MPRA community must enhance core mission capabilities with intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in turn support the Navy’s 
transformation roadmap also known as Sea Power 21” (Osborne and Prindle, 2003).  A 
hub for MPRF expeditionary warfare is used to provide a solid C2 platform while 
conducting sustainment operations.  One of the primary capabilities of a hub is its support 
of the Chief of Naval Operations vision for the expeditionary maritime strategy.  It is 
essential that aircraft support (maintenance control and/or AIMD) provides mission-
capable aircraft for their continuous usage during OPLAN execution missions.  Hubs are 
not only designed to ensure superior effort in MPRA mission sets, but they also provide a 
C2 service center as well as coordinated operation nodes for other task-force, joint, 
and/or coalition commanders in the fleet.  One example of such an operation is observed 
during dynamic targeting exercises where the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force collaborate 
to designate targets from within their central hub.  Once the targets are nominated, effort 
is then directed toward the best strategy to defeat that target whether by naval or air force 
assets.  C2 is established and the controlling authority, derived at the hub, takes the lead 
and provides the action required to complete the sortie. Coordinated operations 
evolutions show that the utilization of a hub has value in the overall expeditionary 
maritime strategy.  
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Figure 2.   Hubs snapshots.  This display is of operations centers along with logistics, 
maintenance and data analysis centers.  The figure includes merged pictures 
from the H&S slides contained in the Master Expeditionary Overview briefs 
given in Misawa, Japan (CTF-72, 2009). 
3. Spoke Capabilities 
The vision and responsibilities of a hub remain the same for spokes (Figure 3).  
However, these are expected to achieve sustained operations while serving as a mobile 
C2 node for MPRF detachments (CTF-72, 2009).  Due to their smaller size, spokes have 
the flexibility to relocate for multi-mission operations with less notice than hubs.  A 
spoke is also designed to be a communications loop between MPRA and the fleet, 
supplying electronic “indications and warnings” signals amongst them.   
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Figure 3.   Spoke snapshots.  These are depictions of spokes that provide forward, ready-
response forces that are presumably easy to construct or remove during 
mobility operations.  This figure includes merged figures taken from the H&S 
slides contained in the Master Expeditionary Overview briefs given in 
Misawa, Japan (CTF-72, 2009). 
4. MPRA: P3C and P8 Aircraft 
Over the years, the MPRA community has been a transformational force as it has 
adapted to changes in mission requirements:  ASW from World War II through the Cold 
War to today; SUW and strike group coordinated operations as we faced the Soviet threat 
at sea; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability demonstrated during operation Desert Storm; and 
ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the Persian Gulf (Brooks, 2003). 
The demonstrated capabilities of the MPRA community will continue to be fielded with 
the current Aircraft Improvement Program (AIP) for the Lockheed Martin P3 Orion 
(P3C) aircraft (Figure 4), which completes the modernization of the force and takes it 
through the transition to multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA). Equipped with new 
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data links and sensors, the AIP-equipped P3C has once again played a key role in ASW, 
SUW, MDA, ISAR and C4ISR in joint operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, India, Korea, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Philippines and many other countries, as detachments, in support of 
operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  
 
Figure 4.   P3C Orion.  This aircraft was assigned to the “Red Lancers” of Patrol 
Squadron Ten, VP-10.  The figure is of Combat Aircrew Seven and Executive 
Officer taxiing home from a Seventh Fleet deployment in December 2007 
(photo taken by a family member of the author in Brunswick, Maine). 
As we move towards MMA, The P8 Poseidon (Figure 5), will truly be 
revolutionary in nature and transform the MPRA’s future. Today, various models and 
upgrades of MPRA are strategically placed throughout the world and in every AOR. 
 
Figure 5.   P8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft.  (Facebook, 2010.) 
 8 
B. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
For this research, our scenarios only involve select countries on the African 
continent.  The above-mentioned missions are some of the many responsibilities MPRA 
and MMA fulfill on a daily basis.  We provide a more detailed description later in this 
document. 
Our MPRA is assumed to carry a full P3C crew of five officers and six enlisted 
persons, a load of 48 external and 36 internal sonobuoys, and minimal support equipment 
from its home station, in the continental U.S., to its designated H&S abroad.  Once the 
H&S are occupied, our goal is to determine which assets better optimize H&S’ 
sustainment to meet demand of sonobuoys, fuel, weapons and other logistics equipment 
required to carry out MPRA missions.   
This research also makes the following assumptions: 
a. The locations of the H&S bases are known, i.e., problem inputs; 
b. The  set of air and sea shuttles that may visit each H&S is known; and, 
c. H&S capacities, as well as each location’s mission set and daily 
operational requirements, are known.  Daily demand for fuel, ordnance 
and stores vary for pre-operations (“PreOps”), build-up (“BuildUp”), and 
sustainment (“Sustain”) stages with the given planning horizon of 45 days. 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: 
In Chapter II, we describe the development of our scenario layout using CLF Planner, a 
tool developed by faculty and students at the Naval Postgraduate School (Brown and 
Carlyle, 2008).  Chapter III describes additional scenario constraints and overall CLF 
Planner inputs, and explains CLF Planner outputs.  Chapter IV comprises our different 
scenario excursions and computational results analysis.  Conclusions and 
recommendations appear in Chapter V. 
 9 
II. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND CLF DESCRIPTION 
A. THE HUB AND SPOKE SCENARIO 
Our scenario hypothesizes a message received from the Nigerian government 
requesting military assistance from the U.S.  The message infers that help is needed to 
curtail the violence of opposed Nigerian forces.  Protection is needed off the shores of  
Bonny, Nigeria (Figure 6) to ensure maritime oil interests as well as oil pipelines along 
the Niger River are secure. Nigeria’s military is heavily engaged in Sudan and cannot 
bring its forces home without increasing casualties and/or creating instability there.  The 
United Kingdom has offered limited military support.  In support of this request, the U.S. 
has set up a central hub in Lagos, Nigeria, to sustain this mission.  The operating area is 
south of Bonny, 300 nautical miles away from Lagos.  That distance equates to an 
approximate one-hour transit time for MPRA to conduct the requested operations.  We 
assume MPRA missions average 10–12 hours in length, thus an eight-hour continuous 
coverage flight is the objective for each aircraft within the operating area.  Also, expected 
turnover of MPRA is hypothesized to ensure that continuous coverage. 
 10 
 
Figure 6.   Hub travel chart to Nigeria.  This charts shows our tactical situation depicting 
the operating area off Bonny, Nigeria, along with allied and enemy forces’ 
locations.  The current position of three enemy Nigerian boats (two Defender 
Class, “PBF,” and a Combattante, “PGGF”), two blue force ships (LCS, 
“littoral combat ship” and Mk (Mark) 9, “FSM”), and the Bonny offshore 
terminal appear within a rectangular area of interest.  The route shown from 
Lagos to the operating area is 280 nautical miles in length and considered the 
transit distance of MPRA from the hub.  [Photo generated in Google Earth 
with overlay by Kline, 2009.] 
We consider four MPRA airbase nodes (the above hub in Lagos, and three 
spokes) throughout the African continent (Figure 7) to: 
a. Transit and support the Nigerian government from Lagos, the primary airbase;  
b. Aid in the eradication of piracy via Djibouti (Djibouti) and Dakar (Senegal); 
c. Complete strike group coordinated operations, ASW, and SUW missions from 
Djibouti, Algiers (Algeria), Dakar and Lagos; and, 
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d. Complete MDA missions with the use of the C4ISR suite primarily from Algiers. 
In addition, we assume each base will have its own AIMD and ASD, and Rota (Spain) is 
the MRC. 
 
Figure 7.   CLF Planner screenshot of H&S locations for our scenario.  Lagos, Nigeria 
(hub); Dakar, Senegal (spoke); Djibouti, Djibouti (spoke); and Algiers, 
Algeria (spoke).  Rota, Spain is the MRC. 
 
For clarity, the MRC, AIMD, and ASD serve the following duties (CTF-72, 
2009): 
1. Maritime reception center: 
a. Enables maritime expeditionary operations in support of the full range of 
military operations; 
b. Fits the existing reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 
model for lines of communication to all the forces; 
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c. Provides centralized location for theater briefings to aircrew and support 
personnel during their induction to the theater; 
d. Allows aircraft launched into joint operations areas to conduct a mission 
enroute to its forward operating base; and, 
e. Leverages “economy of force” efficiencies and existing logistics air heads 
to support multiple theaters of operation through distribution of limited 
assets from secure locations. 
2. Aircraft intermediate maintenance depot is responsible for and conducts:  
a. Engine repair; 
b. Propeller repair; 
c. Airframe and landing gear repair; 
d. Avionics and armament repair ; 
e. Survival gear support; and, 
f. Support equipment maintenance.  
3. Aviation supply department functions are: 
a. H&S pack-up kit management, and 
b. Shipping and receiving of all packages. 
B. THE COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE PLANNER FOR HUB AND SPOKE 
SUSTAINMENT 
“The Navy CLF consists of about 30 special transport ships that carry ship and 
aircraft fuel, ordnance, dry stores, and food, and deliver these to client combatant ships 
underway, making it possible for U.S. naval forces to operate at sea for extended periods” 
(Brown et al., 2009). The CLF planning model is a mixed-integer, linear program that 
minimizes the total number of short-ton-days the combat fleet experiences with stock 
levels below safety stock in four basic commodities:  GSE, ordnance (ORDN), aviation 
fuel (JP8), and GSE diesel fuel (GSF).  The CLF planner can be used to optimize the 
sustainment of H&S by making use of the following features: 
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1. Our hub and three spokes play the role of CLF customers (usually battle 
groups).  We code this as follows:  LAGBG (Lagos hub), DAKBG (Dakar 
spoke), ALGBG (Algiers spoke), and DJIBG (Djibouti spoke). 
2. Customer tracks (usually given as a daily changing latitude and longitude) 
become static locations corresponding to the coordinates of the hub and 
spokes.  For example, LAGBG coordinates remain North 06 degrees 27 
minutes 23 seconds East 03 degrees 25 minutes 17 seconds for the entire 
planning horizon. 
3. The “Fleet restriction” feature, typically used to prevent certain shuttles 
from using certain sea routes, is used to separate overland routes for C17 
aircraft from sea routes for shuttle ships (Figure 8). 
4. Two collocated nodes are created for the MRC in Rota, Spain.  These 
nodes are coded ROTA (for sea shuttles) and ROTAA (Rota Air, for air 
shuttles). 
5. Collocated nodes are also created for selected H&S in order to provide 
separation amongst air routes.  An example of such a node is labeled as 
follows:  ATDJ (Algiers to Djibouti, “Air,” see Figure 8), which, 
combined with the abovementioned fleet restriction, allows only aircraft to 
proceed via this node.  The two arcs associated with the node are a zero-
length arc from ALGBG to ATDJ, and a great-circle arc from ATDJ to 
DJIBG.  (Note:  Each is a two-way arc.) 
The sea and air-route networks regulate the ability of CLF shuttle ships and C17 
aircraft to visit each customer multiple times, if needed, and fulfill its demand.  Air routes 
will be able to track directly from the shuttle’s home to the customer via a great-circle 
track.  The sea routes, which are incapable of tracking over land, will maintain tracks 
over water and circle, as needed, in order to reach the customer’s port.   
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Figure 8.   CLF Planner screenshot for Route Nodes.  Port and node accessibility codes 




III. COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE PLANNER INPUTS 
A. BUILDING THE H&S MODEL IN THE CLF PLANNER 
Our model uses a network of 108 nodes and 177 undirected arcs (Figure 9), most 
of which belong to the sea network.  As previously defined, our H&S customers are 
Lagos (LAGBG), Algiers (ALGBG), Dakar (DAKBG), and Djibouti (DJIBG) with Rota 
(ROTA) and Rota Air (ROTAA), serving as our MRC.  Our design is built to utilize C17 
aircraft and CLF ships to initiate from or visit the MRC, and distribute logistics and 
support equipment to each H&S while maintaining their posture in serving the strike 
groups at sea.   
 
 
Figure 9.   CLF Planner screenshot.  The thinner arcs and nodes represent a sea network.  
The bold arcs represent “air” routes taken by C17 aircraft.  CLF ships may 
visit any node via the depicted sea arcs.  The southeastern nodes and arcs 
appear outside of the AOR but are necessary for the CLF ships to circle the 
African continent with multiple options, given their initial position.  
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1.  Demand Data for Ship Planning Factors 
Our scenario data closely resemble operations conducted on MPRA airbases 
during peacetime operations.  These operations are divided into three phases:  BuildUp, 
PreOps, and Sustain.  The 45-day demand data for H&S is from CTF-72 (Null, 2010).  
All fuel data originally provided in gallons is converted into pounds (Table 1) using a 
conversion factor of 6.7 lbs./gal for JP8 fuel (Petroleum and Water Department, 2003) 
and 7.002 lbs./gal for GSF.  
JP8 GSF GSE ORDN
(lbs)  (lbs) (lbs) (lbs)
HUB 78,883,817 3,184,614 1,760,853 5,305,137
SPOKE (each) 53,517,366 3,184,614 1,460,256 3,595,721
 
Table 1.   CTF-72-approved 45-day demand table.  Commodities are for JP8, GSF, GSE 
and ORDN at H&S. 
We assume daily demands for the Sustain phase of the operations are the 
proportional fraction of total demand provided by CTF-72 (i.e., the figures in Table 1 
divided by 45 days).  Next, we convert all demand data into short-tons and input them 
into the CLF planner’s “ship planning factors” worksheet (Figure 10).  However, we also 
consider PreOps and BuildUp.  Our PreOps totals are three-quarters of the daily 
requirements for sustainment when meeting the JP8 and GSF demands, and one-half of 
the daily sustainment requirements for GSE and ORDN.  The BuildUp demand is set at 
ten percent of the daily sustainment values for JP8, GSF, and GSE.  Lacking a capacity 
figure for H&S, we assume these as approximately equal to the demand of 22½ days of 
Sustain operations.   
PreOps are usually conducted prior to deployment and at the squadrons’ home 
airbase.  However, our PreOps will always occur after an H&S BuildUp.   Some of the 
PreOps activities include crew readiness flights, pilot training flights and carrier strike 
group coordinated operations.  Even though waivers are a viable option, it is beneficial 
for every squadron to conduct proficiency flights so that each crew maintains readiness 
and up-to-date qualifications while on deployment.  Therefore, the PreOps days will help 
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satisfy those requirements.  Most H&S conduct multiple PreOps in some variation of 
beginning and/or end-of-the-month flight operations but our scenario assumes only one 
day for this operation per 45-day cycle.  
 
Figure 10.   CLF Planner screenshot for daily operations demands (in short-tons) to 
sustain a hub or spoke.  The demands listed are daily estimates for each 
operation category.  For evaluation purposes, the H&S capacity is equivalent 
to a 22 ½ day Sustain demand.   
The BuildUp category represents the initial processes that H&S will complete 
prior to conducting operations.  For BuildUp demands, H&S will provide JP8, GSE, and 
GSF for transiting aircraft.  Each H&S will require a total of seven days to conduct its 
BuildUp, which we assume occurs on days one through seven for every H&S in our 
initial scenario.   In a different scenario, we will also analyze a 72-hour BuildUp. 
2.  Shuttles and Shuttle Classes 
The “shuttle classes” worksheet (Figure 11, top) indicates the type of shuttles we 
utilize for our scenario, and associated data to include the maximum speed (in knots) and 
the transport capacities of each commodity (in short-tons).  Most surface shuttles can 
deliver heavy loads of JP5 and GSF.  However, the JP5 commodity will be replaced with 
JP8, for our scenario, for planning purposes and analysis.  The range of CLF shuttle 
speeds are from 15 to 25 knots.  C17s are assumed to travel at an airspeed of 450 knots.  
Our scenario uses the following CLF shuttle ships (by classification): six Henry J. Kaiser-
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Class Single Hull (TAO-SH), one Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship (T-AKE), one 
Combat Stores Ship (T-AFS), two Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE), and one United 
Kingdom’s Fort Victoria class replenishment oiler (UK-AORH).  We also utilize four 
C17s as air shuttles.   
We use each asset available based on shuttle class (i.e., all 15 shuttles from six 
classes are scheduled).  The CLF ships may either start from a user’s predetermined 
location or a location optimally chosen by the CLF mathematical planner.  Each C17’s 
start location is at the user-defined MRC (ROTA).  The CLF shuttles’ start coordinates 
are placed at random nodes in our network.  Also, each CLF shuttle is distinguished as 
loaded or not, which we simulate by randomly selecting eight loaded and seven empty 
ships (Figure 11).   
A description of each shuttle class follows.  All commodity capacities for the 
“shuttle classes” worksheet are replicated from previous research using the shuttles in our 
scenario (Morse, 2008).   The Henry J. Kaiser-Class (T-AO) 187 oiler is an 18-ship series 
(Federation of American Scientists 2010).  Their primary objective is to provide 
underway replenishment of fuel to the U.S. Navy combat ships and JP5 for aircraft 
aboard aircraft carriers at sea.  We classify all our T-AO class shuttles as TAO-SH for 
CLF planner utilization and one of their commodities, for transport, will be JP8 instead of 
JP5.  Previous studies list TAO-SH as having storage capacities (in short-tons) as 
follows:  108,520; 220; and 72,000, for JP5, GSE and GSF, respectively.  We note these 
inventory capacities are independent from demand.  We insert our own GSF commodity 
in lieu of the normal diesel fuel marine in the CLF planner.  The U.S. inventory for the 
aforementioned TAO-SH class shuttles includes consecutive hull numbers labeled from 
T-AO-187 to T-AO-204 except for the T-AO-190 shuttle that was sold in May 2009 and 
commissioned February 2010 by the Chilean Navy.  We have selected six TAO-SH class 
shuttles to complete our H&S operations. 
Some CLF ships are integral parts of the surface battle groups (these are called 
station ships) and others move logistics supplies from ports, forward logistics sites, or 
commercial ship “black hulls” to the strike groups at sea (these are called shuttles).  The 
T-AFS class provides logistic lift to deliver cargo (ammunition, food, limited quantities 
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of fuel, repair parts, ship store items, and expendable supplies and materiel) to U.S. and 
allied navy ships at sea.  In its secondary mission, the T-AKE may have a common plan 
with a T-AO 187 as a substitute station ship to provide direct logistics support to the 
ships within a carrier strike group.  There are four T-AKE hull numbers conducting 
operations. 
As the Navy’s combat logistics role increases throughout the fleet, cost savings 
are seen each year.  One major contributor to the overall minimal cost operation is the T-
AOE class.  Each of the four existing T-AOEs includes a crew of 160 civilian mariners 
and 29 military that rapidly replenishes Navy task forces (U.S. Navy, February 2009).  T-
AOEs are used, in our scenarios, as multi-product shuttles that are capable of carrying 
heavy loads of each of our commodities to include over 93,000 short-tons of JP8 (our 
number one prioritized commodity based on demand alone).  According to the U.S. Navy 
fact file, T-AOEs are capable of speeds of 25 knots, which helps resupply transiting 
carrier strike groups efficiently.   
“One combat stores ship operated by Military Sealift Command provides 
underway replenishment of supplies to Navy combatant ships at sea.  Supplies include 
repair parts, spare parts, food, mail and fuel” (U.S. Navy, February 2009).  The T-AFS is 
one of the CLF shuttles that transports the above supplies.  Each T-AFS is composed of 
127 civilian mariners and 26 sailors and transits at speeds up to 21 knots (U.S. Navy, 
August 2009).   This shuttle class is in process of being replaced by the T-AKE class but 
remains active and in the aforementioned configuration for our study.   
The UK-AORH class of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Wave Knight is a fast fleet 
tanker, and can also store supplies.  We hypothesize one shuttle of this class, the UK-
AORH-C, as making a port visit at Port Elizabeth South Africa and being called to duty 
to supply the H&S during the BuildUp and/or Sustain phases.  The Wave Knight has a 
range of 10,000 nautical miles at 15 knots.  We assume a cruise speed of 18 knots.   
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Figure 11.   CLF Planner screenshot for shuttle inventory.  This screenshot combines 
the “shuttles” and “shuttle classes” worksheets used in the H&S scenario.  
Each shuttle class has a top speed (CLF ships) and cruise speed (C17 aircraft) 
in knots.  All units for the four commodities are in short-tons and indicate 
each class’ capacity for that commodity.  The “shuttles” worksheet displays 
the transit speeds for the shuttles listed.  The time “inport” reflects the amount 
of time each shuttle must remain at the MRC to restock all commodities.  All 
shuttles become available within seven days.  However, their start times and 
coordinates are varied, as shown.   
The four C17s, on deployment, and originating in ROTAA, will serve as the 
immediate respondent to H&S demands.  They are capable of transporting 18 of the 463 
L-model pallets that total approximately 85 short-tons of logistics equipment and cargo.  
According to Boeing airlift business development contact, Colonel Alan K. Baker, U.S. 
Air Force (retired), the C17 is also capable of carrying standard military fuel bladders for 
offload of fuel at refueling locations or combat refueling points.  Accordingly, we run all 
scenarios with JP8 as a transport item onboard the C17 aircraft.   
The C17 is capable of transporting 9,000 gallons of JP8 fuel via its three 3,000-
gallon internal bladders (Petroleum and Water Department 2003).  We can use this 
capacity to transport JP8 fuel on the C17 aircraft, but at the expense of not allowing GSF.  
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Our rational for this is to indulge the C17 in routine operations for our scenario and keep 
JP8 our top priority item, as described in the next paragraph. 
3.  Shuttle Commodities  
The shuttle commodities have been prioritized to depict importance of delivery 
(Figure 12).  We have placed the highest penalty, 100, on unmet JP8 to reflect the priority 
given to fuel in order to fly MPRA.  GSE and GSF are given the lowest penalties 20 and 
30, respectively, due to the existence of local resources for food and the presence of 
AIMD to store GSE.  We place a penalty of 70 on ORDN based on its importance for 
missions flown from either hub or spokes that require armament release (although these 
are more common in a wartime scenario).  Also, ORDN has the potential of being flown 
and released from joint and/or coalition aircraft in the event our MPRA have any ORDN 
release malfunctions during a mission, or prove a less-capable asset for the sortie being 
flown.   
Once a commodity reaches the “safety-stock” level (50% of its inventory 
capacity, in our case), the penalty scales are activated.  Specifically, when an inventory 
level falls below this limit, the commodity’s multiplicative penalty is inflicted on the 
magnitude of this shortfall.  Moreover, if it falls even further below the “extremis” 
violation limit (25% of its inventory capacity, in our case), then ten times the penalty is 
inflicted for the magnitude of this extremis shortfall. 
For example, let us consider the inventory capacities at the hub (see Figure 10).  
These are 19,721 and 1,326 short tons for JP8 and ORDN, respectively.  If, for JP8, the 
inventory falls to 40% of capacity (7,888.4 short tons) then the shortfall with respect to 
safety-stock level will be 10% (1,972.1 short tons), and the assessed penalty will be 
1,972.1×100=197,210.  In comparison, the same penalty can be incurred by a remaining 
inventory of approximately 82.9214 short-tons of ORDN (6.2% of capacity). In this case, 
since the safety-stock and extremis levels are 663 and 331.5 short-tons, respectively, we 
would incur the full penalty in the under-safety segment, 331.5×70=23,205, plus a partial 





Figure 12.   CLF Planner screenshot for shuttle commodities.  This allows the planner 
to prioritize the delivery of each commodity to H&S.  The higher the penalty, 
the more importance is given to the delivery of the commodity.  In the given 
scenario, GSE is the lowest-priority commodity, while JP8 is the highest.  
(Penalty units are at dollars per short-ton shortage.) 
4. Battle Groups and Voyage Plans 
Our scenario is designed to provide sustainment for H&S using our CLF shuttles, 
C17 aircraft and modified C17 carrying ORDN which we denote C17_ORDN aircraft.  
However, we also explore the shuttles’ capability of transporting logistics to H&S as their 
primary supplier during the BuildUp and Sustain phases on each MPRA base.  We model 
a seven-day BuildUp, a one day PreOps, and then a 37-day Sustain phase.  Each of our 
H&S initiates with zero percent inventory.  Our model uses the aforementioned 50% and 
25% of the inventory capacity to set the safety stock and extremis thresholds for 
penalties, respectively (explained in the previous section).  Any hub or spoke may be 
supplied by any shuttle.  The H&S play the role of the CLF planner’s battle groups but 
they remain static throughout each scenario (as can be seen by constant coordinates in 
Figure 13).  The “activity” for each day communicates with the Ship Planning Factors 




Figure 13.   CLF Planner screenshot for battle groups and voyage plans.  The Battle 
Group worksheet displays the initial inventory at each H&S plus the safety 
stock and extremis levels.  Percentages are with regard to the capacity for each 
commodity (Figure 10).  The Battle Group Voyage Plans worksheet shows the 
activity posture of each H&S on the specified day.  That activity 
communicates with the Ship Planning Factors worksheet (Figure 10) to 
determine the demand for that day. 
B. CLF PLANNER SOLUTION REPORTS 
The analysis of results produced by the CLF planner is our basis for deciding 
whether the sustainment demands for each H&S have been achieved.  From running the 
CLF planner we can observe if the safety-stock or extremis levels (in percentages with 
respect to total capacity for each commodity) have been violated.  There are three forms 
of output from CLF planner:  “battle group daily state,” “shuttle schedule,” and “log 
report.”  In addition, there are two other graphical outputs:  map and chart.   
 24 
The Shuttle Schedule (Figure 14) and Battle Group Daily State worksheets’ 
outputs show shuttle activities listed and commodities delivered to each customer.  The 
outputs are similar to an inventory sheet that tracks which shuttle transports the demand 
from the MRC to the customer.  The shuttle schedule output combines multiple inputs 
such as the shuttle type’s storage capacity.  The “in-port” days, at the MRC, show visible 
stock increases for the shuttles being replenished.  The screenshot in Figure 14, not 
particular to our current scenario, gives us an example.  As seen on 17-Nov-09, a 
TAO_M shuttle delivers commodities at ALGBG.  As a result, the commodities it carries 
are used to meet the demand request for ALGBG on that day (not shown in the figure).  
However, the figure shows the TAO_M transits and proceeds inbound to ROTA within 
two days to restock the empty GSF commodity and load JP8 to its maximum capacity.  
The TAO_M shuttles must remain in-port in ROTA for two days before leaving.  We see 
the CLF planners’ scheduling output including in-port status, transit time, and execution 




State Shuttle Date Coordinates Where JP8 GSE GSF ORDN JP8 GSE
direct TAO_M 1-Nov-09 N 26 18 00 E 51 30 00 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 2-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 3-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 4-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 5-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 6-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 7-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 8-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 9-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 10-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 11-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 12-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 13-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 14-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 15-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 16-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
hit TAO_M 17-Nov-09 N 36 42 02 E 03 12 16 ALGBG 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0 2,973.2 0.0
inbound TAO_M 18-Nov-09 105,546.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
loading TAO_M 19-Nov-09 N 36 37 12 W 06 21 00 ROTA 105,546.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
loading TAO_M 20-Nov-09 N 36 37 12 W 06 21 00 ROTA 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
outbound TAO_M 21-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
outbound TAO_M 22-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
idle TAO_M 23-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
idle TAO_M 24-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
idle TAO_M 25-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
hit TAO_M 26-Nov-09 N 36 42 02 E 03 12 16 ALGBG 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0 3,567.8 0.0
direct TAO_M 27-Nov-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 28-Nov-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 29-Nov-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 30-Nov-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 1-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 2-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 3-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 4-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 5-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 6-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 7-Dec-09 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0
hit TAO_M 8-Dec-09 N 06 27 23 E 03 25 17 LAGBG 104,952.2 0.0 35.0 0.0 10,825.1 0.0
direct TAO_M 9-Dec-09 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 10-Dec-09 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 11-Dec-09 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 12-Dec-09 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
direct TAO_M 13-Dec-09 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
hit TAO_M 14-Dec-09 N 14 40 56 W 17 25 48 DAKBG 94,127.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6,303.6 0.0
idle TAO_M 15-Dec-09 87,823.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 1-Nov-09 N 12 46 48 E 44 58 48 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 2-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 3-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 4-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 5-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 6-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
direct TAO_L 7-Nov-09 108,520.0 0.0 220.0 0.0
 Apply Filters
 
Figure 14.   CLF Planner screenshot for shuttle schedule.  This displays the 
coordinates, location, and commodity’s contents onboard the shuttle for each 
time step.  Locations labeled with the “BG” suffix are customers, thus their 
available amounts of each commodity decrease after each visit to that hub or 
spoke.  Sea shuttles are designed to remain two days in port at the MRC 
(ROTA) while loading. 
Charts and maps add a convenient visual reference to CLF planner outputs.  The 
charts show commodity levels over time (examples in the following chapters).  Viewing 
can be done for one commodity at a time for either “all” H&S or by individual hub or 
spoke.  The world map can be separated into sections or continents and has an animation 
option for shuttle locations over time.  Other options allow the user to display route nodes 
and arcs (Figure 9) or shuttle tracks, among others. 
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IV. MODEL INSIGHTS 
A. OPTIMIZATION SCENARIOS 
We have created three scenarios using the five classes of surface shuttles 
described in section III.A.2 and the C17 air-shuttle class.  As a result, we have 11 surface 
shuttles and 4 air shuttles in each scenario.  We assume four CLF shuttles and all C17 
shuttles are loaded on the scenario start date.  All scenarios assume a 45-day planning 
horizon, where we set up the following constraints: 
• Scenario 1 (S1):  Four surface shuttles are pre-loaded and available on day 
one, and seven more are available on day seven; there is no initial 
inventory of any commodity at each H&S; all four C17 aircraft are 
available on the scenario start date; BuildUp occurs on the first seven days 
followed by PreOps on the eighth day. The remaining days of the planning 
horizon comprise the Sustain phase. 
• Scenario 2 (S2):  Same requirements as in S1.  However, BuildUp occurs 
on the first three days followed by PreOps on the fourth day. Then, the 
Sustain phase begins. 
• Scenario 3 (S3):  Same requirements as in scenario S2.  Four surface 
shuttles are pre-loaded and available on day one, and seven more are 
available on the seventh day; there is a 25% initial inventory of all 
commodities at each H&S; all four C17 aircraft are available on the 
scenario start date, with three carrying ORDN only.  BuildUp occurs on 
the first three days, followed by PreOps on the fourth day. Then, the 
Sustain phase begins. 
Our scenarios use the CLF planner to provide an indication of our shuttles’ ability 
to assist in maintaining the readiness posture during OPLAN execution.  S1 and S2 
introduce the concept of “no-fly” days.  The no-fly day, for our scenarios, indicates an 
MPRA is unable to fuel enough JP8 in order to fly one full mission.  S3 answers the 
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question of whether or not a pre-positioned logistics supply significantly contributes to an 
increase in inventory levels during the sustainment phase. 
B. CLF PLANNER RESULTS 
Each scenario has been run on a personal computer with 3.25 GB of RAM at 
approximately 3.16 GHZ of speed.  CLF Planner uses GAMS/CPLEX (2011) as the 
solving engine.  Each scenario has approximately 2,000 variables (120 binary) and 2,800 
constraints, and runs in approximately 45 minutes to converge within a 1% gap. 
1. S1:  Heavy BuildUp 
Table 2 shows the percentage of days that the H&S Sustain demands are met in 
S1. For example, LAGBG, DAKBG and ALGBG meet their ORDN demands during 
96%, 67% and 71% of the Sustain phase.  With a total of 12 replenishments, DJIBG is 
the only operational airbase to fulfill its Sustain requirements by maintaining a positive 
inventory for all commodities during the 37 Sustain days.  However, the detailed daily 
inventory chart for ORDN (Figure 15) shows that there are several days under safety-
stock and extremis levels. 
We conclude that, because there is no initial inventory of any commodity, each 
H&S has the potential to experience at least one day in the extremis level for one or more 
commodities.  Most unmet demand (reflected by inventory “levels” strictly below zero) 





H&S JP8 GSE GSF ORDN
LAGBG 100 100 100 96
DAKBG 98 100 98 67
ALGBG 100 100 100 71
DJIBG 100 100 100 100
% days H&S Sustain demand met
 
Table 2.   Percentage of days that H&S demand is met in Scenario S1.  This table shows 
which H&S is achieving its sustainment requirements (even if in a critical 
state, i.e., extremis level).  Approximately 98%–100% of the H&S demands 
are being met for JP8, GSE, and GSF.  DAKBG only achieves a 67% 
sustainment rate for ORDN. 
  The following shuttles are notably underutilized: 
a. TAO 201: This shuttle has a start date of November 7 (Figure 11) and 
remains idle throughout the entire scenario.  The shuttle does not 
contribute to reduce unmet demand because the TAO-SH class cannot 
carry ORDN and the customers are satisfied by other shuttles for all other 
commodities.  
b. TAFS_WA: This shuttle begins on the scenario start date, but it is not 
loaded.  Therefore, it has to travel 10 days from its initial position to 
ROTA for loading.  After two replenishments to ALGBG (the closest 
spoke from the MRC), it is not used for the last 30 days of the scenario.  
Like the TAO-SH, this shuttle does not carry ORDN. 
c. TAO 189: This shuttle becomes available on November 3, makes one 
replenishment to ALGBG on December 4, and then remains idle through 
the end of the horizon. 
d. TAO 193, TAO 194, and TAO 195: These shuttles never replenish any 




The DJIBG spoke is the major benefactor of CLF shuttle replenishments in S1.  
DAKBG is the only airbase that does not achieve 100% in JP8 sustainment.  This means 
an alternate aircraft fuel (i.e., JP-4, JP-5, or perhaps JET-A fuel supply from the host-
nation’s airport) has to be acquired or there will be a no-fly day at that airbase to support 
its mission set.   
 
 
Figure 15.   CLF Planner screenshot for ORDN levels in Scenario S1. November 9 
represents the start of the Sustain phase.  DJIBG is the only airbase to remain 
above the 0% Inventory Level for the entire 37-day Sustain phase.  LAGBG, 
DAKBG, and ALGBG maintain a positive inventory level for 96%, 67%, and 
71% of their Sustain days, respectively. 
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2. S2 and S3:  Minimum BuildUp 
For scenarios S2 and S3, we have created a three-day initial BuildUp phase.  S2 is 
more difficult to sustain due to the earlier demand of four additional Sustain days under 
the same set-up as for S1.  Table 3 displays the percentage of days the H&S meet their 
Sustain demand in S2.   
 
Table 3.   Percentage of days that H&S meet their Sustain demand, out of 41 days.   
The number of replenishments for H&S in S2 total 24, 16, 22, and 24 for 
LAGBG, DAKBG, ALGBG, and DJIBG, respectively.  Comparatively, S1 provides 18, 
17, 15, and 12 replenishments.  With JP8 as a transport item onboard C17s, they 
complete 58% of all replenishment requests.  However, C17s are incapable of fulfilling 
the entire daily H&S demands for commodities they transport (JP8, GSE, and ORDN), 
thus contributing to the low fulfillment during Sustain days (See Figure 16).   
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Figure 16.   CLF Planner screenshot for ORDN levels in Scenario S2.   Day four (4-
Nov) represents the start of Sustain days.  ALGBG and DJIBG achieve 
approximately 98% and 96% daily Sustain success, respectively.  DAKBG 
and LAGBG achieve only 82% and 76%, respectively. 
 For S3, we create a C17_ORDN shuttle class to carry ORDN, and convert three of 
the four aircraft shuttles into this type.  We also pre-position 25% initial inventory at our 
H&S.  As a result, the CLF planner creates a schedule that satisfies sustainment 
requirements for each day of the scenario (Figure 17).  As seen, each H&S remains clear 
of the extremis inventory level and rarely reaches an under-safety stock level.  S3 proves 
to be our most favorable scenario due to the successful sustainment of all commodities.  
After observing unmet demand for ORDN in S1 and S2, S3 has been designed to correct 
this discrepancy.  It is clear that the addition of C17_ORDN shuttle class and pre-
positioning makes the sustainment phase feasible even with a minimum buildup period.   
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Figure 17.   CLF Planner screenshot for all commodities in Scenario S3.   All 
H&S achieve 100% operational sustainment.  As shown, JP8 and ORDN are 
the only commodities for which H&S had days below the safety stock region 
after 8-Nov.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS   
This research has studied the ability of CLF ships and C17 aircraft to support 
buildup and sustainment operations at four MPRA military airbases (Djibouti, Djibouti; 
Dakar, Senegal; Algiers, Algeria; and Lagos, Nigeria) and one MRC (Rota, Spain).  We 
have implemented a traditional H&S concept with sample demand data from CTF-72. 
We have used the CLF Planner, developed by students and faculty at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, to obtain optimal shuttle schedules for several scenarios.  We 
hypothesize a message received from the Nigerian government requesting military 
assistance from the U.S.   
Our H&S model is a unique application of CLF Planner, which was originally 
designed for surface shuttle ships supplying underway surface ships.  CLF Planner 
developers have incorporated customized coding in order to avoid ships transiting on air 
routes and aircraft flying any profile other than point-to-point.   
CLF Planner uses multiple data inputs to specify the sea routes and point-to-point 
air routes that service our H&S customers. We have represented the region’s navigation 
and aviation routes using 108 nodes and 177 arcs.  We have also represented 15 CLF 
shuttles (11 vessels and 4 aircraft). At the beginning of the planning horizon, all of these 
shuttles have been randomly positioned throughout the AOR and used to convey the four 
commodities required at the H&S: JP8, GSF, GSE, and ORDN. 
We have tested three scenarios, S1, S2, and S3, respectively, for daily demands of 
each of the commodities over a 45-day planning horizon.  We assume a minimum safety-
stock level is reached whenever the inventory falls below 50% of a commodity’s total 
capacity, or an extremis level of 25%.  CLF Planner has produced results for each 
scenario from which decision makers may gain important insights in the planning of the 
operations supported from H&S. 
In Scenario S1, entitled “Heavy BuildUp,” we start with an empty airbase that 
needs to be built into an operational hub or spoke that is capable of continued 
sustainment of the various MPRA missions.  The buildup phase consists of the first seven 
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days where no airbase (LAGBG, DAKBG, ALGBG nor DJIBG) has an initial stock of 
any commodity.  CLF Planner produces a feasible outcome that could, presumably, be 
considered successful by many commanders: Even though it leaves a modest amount of 
unmet demand of ORDN, it meets 100% of the demands for the JP8, GSE, and GSF 
commodities (for all but DAKBG, which still achieves 98% sustainment for both JP8 and 
GSF).  While some shuttles work expeditiously in order to fulfill H&S’s demands, the 
TAO_SH class shuttles are used only modestly because they cannot carry ORDN (and 
therefore they cannot help reduce the unmet demand for this commodity). The rest of the 
unmet demand is due solely to long transit times for all CLF ships.  
Scenarios S2 and S3 are both referred to as “Minimum BuildUp” because we 
assume the buildup phase must be completed in only three days.   All other requirements 
for S2 are the same as for S1. Our computational results show the minimum buildup 
period makes the sustainment phase even more difficult.  The H&S spend more days in 
the extremis level for S2 in comparison to S1.  Also, LAGBG is the only hub or spoke to 
achieve 100% sustainment for three of four commodities.    
S3 also starts with a minimum buildup period.  However, we assume dedicated 
ORDN air shuttles and pre-positioning of commodities at the extremis level.  No demand 
is left unmet for any day during the sustainment phase.  Thus, we recommend this 
scenario for H&S operations. 
We have demonstrated the use of the CLF Planner as an H&S model to show the 
importance of pre-staging commodities and dedicating certain shuttles.  This changing of 
planning assumptions and quickly testing logistic feasibility can be applied across a range 
of scenarios in various regions.  Future research may test new scenarios where, for 
example: (a) All CLF shuttles, instead of the four used for our scenario, are preloaded in 
order to prevent the initial trip to the MRC; and, (b) Compare with manually developed 
plans where, for example, some of the CLF shuttles are “geographically” dedicated to 
certain customers. 
Also, we recommend the addition of the CLF planner into the U.S. Navy’s 
“Collaboration at Sea” website for planning purposes. 
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